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This report was written with the enormous pro bono assistance of the law fi rms Morrison & Foerster L.L.P. and Ropes 
& Gray L.L.P.. For more information about Ropes & Gray L.L.P., please visit www.ropesgray.com, for more information 
about Morrison & Foerster, please visit www.mofo.com. 
The myriad technological methods by which “e-deceptive practices” might be perpetrated are laid out in tremendous 
detail in the companion report to this produced by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at www.epic.org.
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INTRODUCTION
In the last several election cycles, “deceptive practices” have been perpetrated in order to suppress voting and skew 
election results. Usually targeted at minorities and in minority neighborhoods, deceptive practices are the intentional 
dissemination of false or misleading information about the voting process with the intent to prevent an eligible voter 
from casting a ballot. It is an insidious form of vote suppression that often goes unaddressed by authorities and the 
perpetrators are virtually never caught. Historically, deceptive practices have taken the form of fl yers distributed in a 
particular neighborhood; more recently, with the advent of new technology “robocalls” have been employed to spread 
misinformation. Now, the fear is deceptive practices 2.0: false information disseminated via the Internet, email and 
other new media. 
In the past, the worst practices involved fl yers distributed in predominantly minority communities. The 2004 
presidential election cycle provides some particularly vivid examples. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, fl iers purportedly from 
the “Milwaukee Black Voters League” were distributed in minority neighborhoods claiming “If you’ve already voted in 
any election this year, you can’t vote in the presidential election; If anybody in your family has ever been found guilty 
of anything, you can’t vote in the presidential election; If you violate any of these laws, you can get ten years in prison 
and your children will get taken away from you.” In Pennsylvania, a letter with the McCandless Township seal on it 
falsely informed voters that, to cut down on long lines, Republicans would vote on November 2 and Democrats would 
vote on November 3—the day after the election. Similar fl iers were distributed at Ross Park Mall in Allegheny County. 
In Ohio, a so-called “Urgent Advisory” memo on phony Board of Elections letterhead warned voters that if they were 
registered by the NAACP, America Coming Together, the Kerry campaign, or their local Congressional campaign, they 
were disqualifi ed and would not be able to vote until the next election. 
More recently, automated calls, known as robocalls in the world of political campaigns, have been the weapon of 
choice. In 2006, the Secretary of State of Missouri, Robin Carnahan, reported that in one county, “robo-calls reportedly 
warned voters to bring photo ID to the polls or they would not be allowed to vote. There were also reports on the 
radio in Kansas City of automated telephone calls telling voters their polling places had been changed and giving 
incorrect polling place information.”1 According to the National Network for Election Reform, “Registered voters in 
Virginia, Colorado, and New Mexico reported receiving phone calls in the days before the election claiming that their 
registrations were cancelled and that if they tried to vote they would be arrested.2 In Virginia, “Voters in Arlington, 
Accomack, Augusta, and Northampton counties in Virginia received phone calls on November 6 saying voters would be 
arrested if they attempted to vote on Election Day. Some of the phone calls also told voters that their polling locations 
had been moved, although none of the locations had changed.”3 
How might such activities translate online? Emails that appear to come from legitimate sources, such as a campaign, 
an elections offi ce, a party or a nonprofi t organization could be sent in a targeted fashion that contain false or 
misinformation about the voting time, place or process, or claiming that a poll site has been moved. Just at the time 
of this writing the fi rst serious instance of email with bogus information came to light in Florida, where voters were 
receiving emails stating that voters whose ID failed to match a state database on Election Day would be turned away 
from the polls.4 
Making matter worse, spyware could be used to collect information on a voter and their online behavior to better 
target deceptive emails.5 Partisan mischief-makers with a bit of technological knowledge could spoof the offi cial 
sites of secretaries of state, voting rights organizations or local election boards and advertise completely wrong 
information about anything from poll locations to voter identifi cation requirements. Someone could also appropriate 
website names that are one letter off from the offi cial site name—a typo domain or “cousin domain”—that appear to 
be an offi cial site, and post phony information. Pharming—hacking into domain name system servers and changing 
Internet addresses—could be used to redirect users from an offi cial site to a bogus one with bad information on it. As 
more and more people move from traditional phone lines to internet based calling platforms (known as VOIP or Voice 
Over Internet Protocol), deceptive robocalls might become even more pervasive as they will be virtually untraceable. 
So far in this election cycle, these tactics have already been utilized to spread false information about candidates. 
Barack Obama has been the most prominent target of these attacks. Several emails have circulated widely which 
have titles such as “Who Is Barack Obama” and “Can a good Muslim become a good American.” The content of the 
emails has often been the same, highlighting Obama’s middle name of “Hussein” and incorrectly claiming he is of 
Muslim faith. While the Obama Campaign suffers through a seemingly unprecedented level of this activity, in 2004 
supporters of Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry were sent an email that looked almost exactly like offi cial 
campaign emails, asking for donations. The email actually came from India and was a scam to steal people’s money.6 
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Hillary Clinton did not fully escape such tactics either. The NAACP was forced to release on its website a statement 
from it’s chairman Julian Bond stating that an email listing “10 Reasons Not to Vote for Hillary Clinton” supposedly 
authored by him was a hoax. 
This year during the primaries, according to the online publication Wired, a series of false campaign websites 
materialized that appeared to be legitimate, such as FredThomsonForum.com, RudyGiulianiForum.com, and 
MittRomneyforum.com. Wired reported that these sites featured posts “under the impersonated names of popular 
political pundits and bloggers” and “promote misleading links to candidate sites that route to YouTube videos 
attacking them. Most posts adopt the persona of a supporter of the candidate, while offering views that amount to 
over-the-top parodies of genuine boosters.”7
After the primaries, domain names with prospective and actual vice-presidential nominees’ names popped up, 
leading to sites with unexpected information. For example, Obama-Biden.org and Obama-Biden.com diverted people 
to the website of the American Issues Project, an extremely anti-Obama third party organization. As reported by the 
Los Angeles Times, the McCain-Romney.com website took viewers to the “offi cial home of the Hundred Year War…and 
Bush’s Third Term!”8 
An extensive analysis of abuse of campaign domain names found that, “Candidates have not done a good job at 
protecting themselves by proactively registering typo domains to eliminate potential abuse. In fact, we were only able 
to fi nd one single typo web site that had been registered by a candidate’s campaign - http://www.mittromny.com. All 
other typo domains were owned by other third parties that appeared unrelated to the candidate’s campaign.”9 
This same study also enumerated several specifi c instances of “typo squatting” of domain names that were meant to 
look like actual campaign websites, including such gems as “narakobama.com” and mikehukabee.com.”10 These sites 
were either advertising sites or directed users to sites with “differing political views.”11
Phony campaign websites have also been created to dupe people into making campaign donations that are really 
going into someone’s pocket, not any campaign. In 2004, phishers (people who use e-mail to fraudulently obtain data 
from a user) set up a fi ctitious website purporting to be for the Democrats that stole the user’s credit card number, 
and another site that had users call a for-fee 1-900 number.12 This year, an Internet site was set up offering to register 
people to vote for $9.95, a process that is free.13 In August 2008, the Federal Trade Commission issued a warning 
to consumers about voter registration scams. Prospective voters were receiving emails and phone calls from people 
claiming to be affi liated with an election board or civic group and asking for the person’s social security number 
or credit card number to confi rm eligibility or registration to vote. The FTC said the purpose was to commit identity 
theft.14 
This report seeks to explore how such attacks might take place in the voting rights context and the measures 
that can be taken to contend with them effectively. The main focus of the report is an investigation into whether 
our existing state and federal legal structure is suffi ciently equipped to deter and punish perpetrators of online 
deceptive practices. On the state level, we examine current anti-hacking and computer crimes laws, laws regarding 
the unauthorized use of state seals and insignia and impersonation of public offi cials, and voting rights laws. Each 
of these subsections is accompanied by recommendations for ways in which state laws can be improved to better 
address these types of serious transgressions. We also look extensively at current federal law, including the Voting 
Rights Act, copyright, trademark, anti-cybersquatting laws, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Wire Fraud 
Statute, Section 230 of the Communications Act, and the Can-Spam Act. Again, recommendations for improving 
federal law are offered. 
We conclude with recommendations for those of us who are not prosecutors or technologists, especially elections 
offi cials, the campaigns, the media, including online media, voting rights and community groups, and of course, 
the voters. 
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STATE LAWS
I. VOTING RIGHTS LAWS
Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has laws involving voting rights and the administration of 
elections. Most states prohibit interference with the election process in some manner, but state statutes vary 
signifi cantly in scope and application. For example, some state laws focus on interference with the physical 
act of voting by prohibiting “electioneering” within a certain proximity of the polling place. Others address 
manipulation of or tampering with ballots, voting machines, or registration logs. Still others outlaw behavior meant 
to harass, intimidate, or bribe voters. While these categories of laws are critical to ensuring the fair and effective 
administration of elections, some states have supplemented them with laws generally applicable to interference 
with the election process or dissemination of false information about voting procedures, candidates, or issues in 
the election. States that have these more general laws are better equipped to curtail deceptive practices, online or 
otherwise, in the voting process. 
 With the advent of online communications, the deceptive tactics once perpetrated through leafl ets and phone 
calls may start to appear in e-mails and on websites. Many state legislatures have recently begun to enact laws 
that explicitly prohibit false statements or other types of voting fraud perpetrated in cyberspace, but if interpreted 
broadly, even most older statutes can effectively combat deceptive practices perpetrated online. The following 
sections detail general trends and important considerations associated with voting fraud laws in all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia.15 The state statutes highlighted below are not necessarily models of best and worst 
practice, but they do provide examples of strong voting fraud provisions that can be used to combat electronic 
deceptive voting practices now and in the future.
LAWS PROHIBITING FALSE STATEMENTS
Almost all states have laws that prohibit false statements regarding elections, and these laws generally fall within 3 
categories:
• Laws focused on process: These laws typically prohibit the dissemination of false information relating to 
registration qualifi cations, election day identifi cation requirements, polling place locations, and other procedural 
matters affecting the vote. For example, the Virginia statute makes it a misdemeanor to “knowingly communicate 
false election information to a registered voter about the time, date, or place of voting” and “to knowingly 
communicate false information concerning the voter’s precinct, polling place, or a voter registration status.” VA. 
CODE ANN. § 24.2-1005.1. 
• Laws focused on substance: These laws typically prohibit the dissemination of false information about candidates 
or issues, rather than election or voting procedures. The Alaska and Wisconsin statutes both prohibit a person from 
knowingly making a false statement about a candidate that is intended to, or actually does, affect an election. 
ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.14; WIS. STAT. § 12.05. 
• Laws applicable to both process and substance: The strongest state laws relating to false statements are those 
that are broadly applicable to false statements relating to an election, whether it be the procedural issues involved 
or the substantive issues relating to the candidate or ballot measures. For example, Louisiana law prohibits 
the distribution or transmission of any “oral, visual, or written material containing a false statement about a 
candidate. . . or proposition,” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18:1463, as well as false information about any matter of “voting 
or. . . registration.” Id. §18:1461, §18:1461.1. 
Although the applicability of false statement provisions is somewhat limited by the process/substance constraints 
discussed above, these laws likely apply regardless of how the false statement is communicated. The statutes 
may not explicitly indicate that online or electronic communications are covered, but common terms found in the 
statutes such as “dissemination,” “communicate,” or “statement” are broad enough to encompass all forms of 
communication.
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The Tension Between Free Speech and Laws Prohibiting False Statements: 
Spotlight on Nevada
A concern surrounding laws dealing with political speech is the possible infringement on First Amendment 
freedom of speech rights. Accordingly, while voting fraud laws must be inclusive and apply broadly, legislatures 
must be careful to limit the laws’ scope to speech not protected by the constitution. In addition to the content of 
the speech, due process (i.e., the way in which the law is enforced) concerns must also be considered. 
In Nevada Press Association v. Nevada Commission on Ethics, the U.S. District Court for Nevada ruled that 
Nevada’s voting fraud law was unconstitutional because the manner in which the law was enforced did not 
survive the strict judicial scrutiny required by First Amendment jurisprudence. Nevada Revised Statute § 
294A.345 “prohibit[ed] any person from making a false statement, with actual malice, about a candidate for 
political offi ce with the intent and effect of impeding the success of the candidate’s campaign.” Instead of 
resolving a claim through the state court system, a candidate claiming to be the victim of a false statement 
could fi le a request with the Nevada Ethics Commission within ten days of the alleged false statement. The 
Commission was required to hold a hearing within fi fteen days of the request and give an opinion within three 
days of the hearing as to whether the statement was true or false. Although the false statement/actual malice 
framework of the statute survived the court’s scrutiny, the court ultimately held the statute unconstitutional 
because the abbreviated dispute resolution procedure led by the Ethics Commission signifi cantly deviated from 
civil and criminal standards of due process and greatly increased the chance of an erroneous decision. 
In short, Nevada Press Association makes two clear points. First, any model statute that could potentially 
encroach on First Amendment protections should expressly include constitutionally required elements such as 
“actual malice,” and, second, the manner in which a statute is enforced, i.e., due process, must be considered 
when analyzing the effectiveness and constitutional validity of a voting fraud statute.
LAWS THAT BROADLY PROHIBIT DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
The most effective way to combat online voting fraud is to broadly prohibit deceptive practices relating to an election 
or the casting of a vote. Many states have implemented laws to combat deception in the voting process, but no state’s 
statute has emerged as a clear model for other states. The following state statutes, however, have provisions that would 
apply broadly to deceptive practices in the context of online voting fraud and may be useful for other states to consider:
• Alabama: The Alabama statute prohibits “any person . . . by any [] corrupt means, from attempting to infl uence any 
elector in giving his/her vote, deterring the elector from giving the same, or disturbing or hindering the elector in 
the free exercise of the right of suffrage . . . .” ALA. CODE § 17-17-38. 
• Colorado: The Colorado statute provides: “It is a crime to knowingly make, publish or circulate or cause to be made, 
published or circulated in any writing any false statement designed to affect the vote on any issue submitted to 
voters at any election or relating to any candidate for election to public offi ce.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109. 
• Maine: The Maine statute prohibits “any interference with a voter attempting to cast a ballot, or any attempt to 
infl uence a voter in marking his/her ballot.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 674(1). 
The above statutory provisions are not only broad enough to encompass nearly all types of deceptive practices 
(e.g., dissemination of false registration and polling place information, creation of phony “offi cial” materials, or 
the spread of unfounded rumors about candidates), but are also expansive enough to cover deceptive practices 
perpetrated solely online. Also, the statutes featured above apply to deceptive practices generally regardless of 
whether the tactics are accompanied by bribery, intimidation, or harassment. While it is certainly understandable 
for state legislatures to focus on the most egregious types of voter interference, voters may also be disenfranchised 
as a result of simple misinformation disseminated by wrongdoers. Virginia and Missouri also have strong deceptive 
practices laws on the books.16
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An Innovative Approach: Spotlight on California
In addition to the broadly applicable laws discussed above, California’s “political cyberfraud” law is specifi cally 
designed to deter and penalize deceptive practices perpetrated online. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18320-23. California’s 
political cyberfraud law makes it “unlawful for a person, with intent to mislead, deceive, or defraud, to commit 
an act of political cyberfraud.” Political cyberfraud is defi ned as a knowing and willful act concerning a political 
website that is committed with the intent to deny a person access to a political website, deny a person the 
opportunity to register a domain name for a political website, or cause a person reasonably to believe that a 
political website has been posted by a person other than the person who posted the website, and would cause a 
reasonable person, after reading the website, to believe the site actually represents the views of the proponent or 
opponent of a ballot measure. 
Political cyberfraud includes, but is not limited to, the following acts: 
• Intentionally diverting or redirecting access to a political website to another person’s website by the use of a 
similar domain name, meta-tags, or other electronic measures. 
• Intentionally preventing or denying exit from a political website by the use of frames, hyperlinks, 
mousetrapping, popup screens, or other electronic measures. 
• Registering a domain name that is similar to another domain name for a political website. 
• Intentionally preventing the use of a domain name for a political website by registering and holding the 
domain name or by reselling it to another with the intent of preventing its use, or both.
While California’s law should be expanded to cover all aspects of online election fraud rather than limiting it to 
political websites, it provides a fairly comprehensive framework for addressing online voter fraud. 
LAWS THAT PROHIBIT TAMPERING WITH ELECTION OR CAMPAIGN MATERIALS
Even states that do not specifi cally prohibit false statements or deceptive practices perpetrated online may have 
provisions that combat misinformation in the voting process. Many states, for example, have laws addressing either 
election or campaign materials, such as prohibitions on the destruction of ballots, ballot box stuffi ng, or interference 
with the distribution of election or campaign information. The strongest statutory provisions in this category explicitly 
include electronic activity. 
• Illinois: The Illinois statute not only prohibits tampering with voting machines and placing anything other than a 
ballot in a ballot box, but it also makes it a felony to “destroy, mutilate, deface, falsify, forge, conceal or remove 
any record, register of voters, affi davit, return or statement of votes, certifi cate, tally sheet, ballot, or any other 
document or computer program . . .” in connection with an election. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/29-6, 5/29-7. 
Not all statutes plainly cover electronic materials; a few are even explicitly restricted to physical materials and 
contain limiting terms such as “paper” or “card.” For the most part, however, statutes that prohibit tampering with 
election materials can be interpreted to include electronic materials, such as e-mails, databases, documents, and 
websites. Below are examples of statutes that may be interpreted so as to apply to online tactics.
• Arizona: Arizona law prohibits the delivery or mailing of “any document that falsely simulates a document from 
the government of this state, a county, city or town or any other political subdivision,” where such mailing is done 
in an attempt to infl uence the outcome of an election. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-925(A). Although the provision does not 
explicitly apply to online communications, the terms “mailing” and “document” could easily be interpreted by a 
creative prosecutor to include e-mails, websites, and the like. 
• New Mexico: New Mexico’s law prohibits “printing, causing to be printed, distributing or displaying false or 
misleading” information relating to the voting or election process. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-20-9. This law was enacted 
in 1979, long before online communications, but could encompass printing from a computer rather than with 
a printing press, posting false information online that someone else subsequently prints, disseminating false 
information through e-mail, or displaying false information on a website or message board.
DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0: LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES /  COM
M
ON CAUSE, THE LAW
YERS COM
M
ITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
 AND THE CENTURY FOUNDATION
8 
In general, a survey of state election laws indicates that most states have provisions that, if creatively applied, could 
serve to deter and to penalize many of the deceptive practices perpetrated online. Nevertheless, nearly all state laws in 
this context would benefi t from close examination by their state legislatures, which should consider enacting laws to 
broadly prohibit those deceptive practices that have the potential of interfering with the campaign or election process.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• States without laws prohibiting deceptive practices in the context of an election should enact laws that explicitly 
cover such practices perpetrated online.
• States with laws already prohibiting deceptive practices in the context of an election should amend their laws to 
explicitly include such practices perpetrated online.
• States with content-specifi c false statements laws should expand their laws to explicitly include false statements 
about election and voting procedure.
• States prohibiting only bribes, threats, or other overtly coercive acts should expand their statutes to cover more 
clandestine practices (such as dissemination of false statements online). 
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State Laws Regarding Deceptive Voter Practices
State
False 
Statements 
Prohibited
Interference with or 
Fraud in the Election 
Process Prohibited
No Requirement that Intimidation, 
Bribery, or Threats be Present
Tampering with 
Election Materials 
Prohibited
Voting Laws Explicitly 
Applicable to Electronic or 
Online Activity
AL 1
AK 2
AZ 3
AR
CA
CO 4
CT 5
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA 6
MI 7
MN
MS 8
MO
MT
NE 9
NV
NH
NJ 10
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA 11
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
1. Alabama does not have specifi c fraud statutes related to the election, but it does prohibit offi cial authorities and employers from unduly infl uencing voters’ ability to vote freely. 
2. Alaska’s false information laws do not apply to attempts to spread false information about an election or registration; they only apply to false information about a candidate.
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §16-925(A) prevents the delivery or mailing of deceptive election documents in an attempt to infl uence the election.
4. COLO. REV. STAT. §1-13-201 prohibits interference with registration, but does not mention interference with the actual election.
5. Connecticut law prohibits issuing misleading instructions to voters.
6. The Massachusetts statute explicitly deals with voting lists, or registrations, and does not mention the actual election process.
7. This only applies to false statements about candidates.
8. The relevant statute also requires that someone be knowingly defrauded through the use of a false statement.
9. NEV. REV. STAT. §32-1538 prevents the fraudulent assistance of an illiterate voter. There are also statutes dealing with interference with the election process.
10. New Jersey law prohibits the dissemination of false election materials.
11. Pennsylvania primarily prohibits interfering with elected offi cials.
DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 2.0: LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES /  COM
M
ON CAUSE, THE LAW
YERS COM
M
ITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW
 AND THE CENTURY FOUNDATION
10 
State Abbreviation Statute Reference(s)
Alabama AL
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-11-8, 17-17-4, 17-9-50, 17-5-17, 17-17-38, 17-17-39, 17-17-44, 17-17-45, 
17-24-4
Alaska AK ALASKA STAT. §§ 15-56-14, 15-56-25
Arizona AZ ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-1006(A), 16-1017(6), 16-925(A)
Arkansas AR ARK. CODE ANN. §5-42-102
California CA CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 18320, 18500, 18540, 18564
Colorado CO COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-13-109, 1-13-112, 1-13-201, 1-13-713
Connecticut CT CONN. GEN. STAT. §9
Delaware DE DEL. CODE. ANN. §§ 5161, 5162, 5123, 5116, 5117, 5118, 5125, 5139
District of Columbia DC
Florida FL FLA. STAT. §§ 104.012, 104.041, 104.0515, 104.061, 104.091
Georgia GA GA. CODE ANN. §21-2-567
Hawaii HI HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 19-3, 19-4, 19-6
Idaho ID IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-2305, 18-101
Illinois IL ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/29-1, 5/29-2, 5/29-4, 5/29-6, 5/29-7, 5/29-10–13, 5/29-17–18
Indiana IN IND. CODE §§ 3-14-3-10, 3-14-3-21.5
Iowa IA IOWA CODE §39
Kansas KS KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-2415, 25-2407, 25-2414, 25-2426, 25-2433
Kentucky KY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 119.155, 119.255, 119.275, 119.305, 119.315, 119.345, 119.335
Louisiana LA LA REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:Et Seq, 18:1463, 18:1461, 18:1461.1
Maine ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 603, 2931, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 674(1)
Maryland MD MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §16
Massachusetts MA
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 29, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 39, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 56, § 43, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 10, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 23, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 30.
Michigan MI MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 168.931, 168.932(A), 168.944
Minnesota MN MINN. STAT. §§ 204C.06, Subd., 1, 204C.06, Subd., 3, 204C.035
Mississippi MS MISS. CODE ANN. §§97-13-37, 97-13-39, 97-45-3, 97-13-21
Missouri MO MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.631, 115. 633, 115.635, 115.637
Montana MT MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-35-206, 13-35-208, 13-35-217, 13-35-218, 13-35-103
Nebraska NE NEB. REV. STAT. §32
Nevada NV NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 293.700–293.840
New Hampshire NH N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 652–671
New Jersey NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:28-8, 19:34-29, 19:34-1.1, 19:34-28, 19:34-46, 19:34-66, 19:34-68
New Mexico NM N.M. STAT. §1-20-9
New York NY N.Y. ELEC. LAW §17-166
North Carolina NC N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-275
North Dakota ND N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1–14-02
Ohio OH OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §3599
Oklahoma OK OKLA. STAT. §§ 76-3–4, 16-113
Oregon OR OR. REV. STAT. §164.377
Pennsylvania PA 25 P.S. §§ 3527, 3547
Rhode Island RI R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-19-42, 19-19-43, 17-19-46, 17-23-1, 17-23-2, 17-23-17
South Carolina SC S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-25-80, 7-25-190, 7-25-180
South Dakota SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-26-10-11, 12-26-15, 12-26-12
Tennessee TN Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-19-142, 1-19-116, 2-19-103
Texas TX TEX. ELEC. ANN. § 61
Utah UT UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-4-501(1)(C), 20A-3-502(1)(B)
Vermont VT VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2017, 2019, 1972
Virginia VA VA. CODE ANN. §24.2-1005.1
Washington WA WASH. REV. CODE §29A.8.630
West Virginia WV W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-11, 3-9-10
Wisconsin WI WIS. STAT. §§ 12.05, 12.09
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II. PROHIBITING THE IMPERSONATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Most states have laws that prohibit the impersonation of public offi cials/public servants. Notably, certain of these 
states have impersonation laws directly related to the election process. 
GENERAL STATE IMPERSONATION LAWS
Many states have general laws regarding the impersonation of public offi cials/public servants that merely prohibit 
such impersonation. Such state laws appear to be quite broad and there appears to be no case law on point 
addressing whether such laws would apply to impersonation of public offi cials/public servants in connection with 
voter deception practices. Presumably, these laws could be applied to online voter deception practices. For example, 
such laws may apply if an impersonator via a website or email communication deceives voters by 1) impersonating a 
public offi cial, including an election offi cial, where the impersonator distributes false information relating to polling 
places, voting requirements, or the like, or 2) creating a website that is made to appear as the offi cial site of a state’s 
Secretary of State or claiming to be the state’s Secretary of State. Notably, effective November 1, 2008, New York will 
have a new law that makes it a violation of its Penal Law to impersonate another “by communication by Internet 
website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefi t or injure or defraud another, or by such communication 
pretends to be a public servant in order to induce another to submit to such authority or act in reliance on such 
pretense.” NY PENAL LAW § 190.25.
STATE IMPERSONATION LAWS SPECIFIC TO THE ELECTION PROCESS
As previously mentioned, there are a few states that have enacted impersonation laws specifi cally related to the 
election process. For example, Alabama prohibits fraudulently misrepresenting oneself or other persons/organizations 
as speaking, printing, acting for or on behalf of a candidate, political campaign committee or political party in 
a manner that is damaging/intended to damage such person/entity. ALA. CODE § 17-5-16. Maryland prohibits the 
impersonation of a voter and attiring/equipping someone to give the impression of performing a government function 
in connection with an election. MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW §§ 16-101 and 16-903. Massachusetts prohibits interference 
with election offi cials. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 48. Impersonation of an election offi cial may qualify as interfering. 
Nebraska prohibits the impersonation of an elector to register voters. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1503. Presumably, such laws 
may apply to online voter deception practices.
STATES WITH NO LAWS PROHIBITING IMPERSONATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
There are a handful of states that do not have any laws regarding the impersonation of public offi cials. See the 
corresponding chart entitled “State Laws Prohibiting Impersonation of Public Offi cials” for the identifi cation of 
such states.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the existing state laws prohibiting the impersonation of public offi cials, the following is recommended:
• States without laws prohibiting the impersonation of public offi cials should enact laws that cover the 
impersonation of public offi cials, explicitly prohibiting the impersonation of public offi cials a) online or by other 
electronic means and b) in connection with the election process.
• States with laws already prohibiting the impersonation of public offi cials not expressly related to the election 
process should amend their laws to explicitly prohibit the impersonation of public offi cials a) online or by other 
electronic means and b) in connection with the election process.
• States with laws already prohibiting the impersonation of public offi cials in connection with the election process 
should amend their laws to enhance such prohibitions and explicitly prohibit the impersonation of public offi cials 
online or by other electronic means.
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State Laws Prohibiting Impersonation of Public Offi cials
State
Fraudulently 
misrep. self or 
another/org. as 
printing, acting 
for/on behalf of a 
candidate, political 
party or committee 
that damages/
is intended to 
damage such 
person/org.
Prohibited from 
impersonating a 
public servant or 
offi cial, i.e. offi cer/ 
employee of gov’t 
(Eff. 11/1/08, NY 
law will specifi cally 
cover comm. by 
web/electronic 
means)
Assuming false 
identity with intent 
to defraud; or 
pretending to be 
rep. of person/ 
org. with intent to 
defraud
Prohibited from 
impersonating a 
public offi cer
General false 
impersonation 
with intent to gain 
a benefi t for self 
or another or to 
injure, or defraud 
another
Prohibits 
impersonating 
a political party 
offi cer
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
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State
Prohibited from 
impersonating 
a voter
Prohibited 
from attiring/ 
equipping 
someone to 
give impression 
performing 
gov’t function in 
connection with 
an election
Prohibited from 
impersonating 
state offi cers
Prohibited from 
disguising 
oneself to 
obstruct law, 
disguising 
oneself as an 
election offi cial 
to violate 
election law
Prohibits 
interfering with 
election offi cials
Prohibits 
impersonation 
of an elector to 
register voters
None
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH 1
NJ
NM
NY
NC 2
ND
OH 3
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA 1
WA
WV
WI
WY 1
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Statute References
State Abbreviation Statute Reference(s)
Alabama AL ALA. CODE § 17-5-16
Alaska AK ALASKA STAT. TIT. 11, CH. 56, ART. 5
Arizona AZ ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-105(33)(a), 13-2006 and 13-2406
Arkansas AR N/A
California CA CAL. PENAL CODE § 538(g)
Colorado CO COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-902 and 24-80-903
Connecticut CT N/A
Delaware DE N/A
District of Columbia DC D.C. CODE § 22-1403
Florida FL N/A
Georgia GA GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-23
Hawaii HI N/A
Idaho ID IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-3005 and 34-108
Illinois IL ILL. COMP. STAT. 5132-5
Indiana IN IND. CODE § 35-44-2-3
Iowa IA IOWA CODE TIT. XVI, SUBTIT. 1, CH. 718.2
Kansas KS KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3824 and 25-2424
Kentucky KY KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 519.010(3) and 519.050
Louisiana LA LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:112
Maine ME ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17-A, § 457
Maryland MD MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §§ 16-101, 16-201 and 16-903
Massachusetts MA MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 56, § 48 and CH. 268 §§ 33 AND 34
Michigan MI MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.217
Minnesota MN MINN. STAT. § 609.475
Mississippi MS MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-7-43
Missouri MO N/A
Montana MT MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-209
Nebraska NE NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-608, 28-609 and 32-1503
Nevada NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.430
New Hampshire NH N/A
New Jersey NJ N/A
New Mexico NM N/A
New York NY N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25
North Carolina NC N/A
North Dakota ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-13-04
Ohio OH N/A
Oklahoma OK N/A
Oregon OR OR. REV. STAT. § 162.365
Pennsylvania PA 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4912
Rhode Island RI R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-14-1
South Carolina SC S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-735
South Dakota SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-1-9
Tennessee TN TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-301
Texas TX TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.11
Utah UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-512
Vermont VT VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, CH. 67 §§ 1705 and 3002
Virginia VA N/A
Washington WA WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.60.040
West Virginia WV W. VA. CODE § 61-5-27
Wisconsin WI WIS. STAT. § 946.69
Wyoming WY N/A
1: State law is limited to impersonation of a police offi cer; 
2: State law is limited to impersonation of police offi cers and emergency personnel; 
3: State law is limited to impersonation of state representatives and police offi cers.
III. THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF STATE SEALS AND INSIGNIA
Approximately half of the states have laws regarding the unauthorized use of state seals and insignia. Of these 
states, most of them broadly prohibit the unauthorized use of state seals. Accordingly, such laws could be applied 
to disenfranchisement efforts such as use of online and digital communications that bear a seal or insignia that 
is deceptively similar to an offi cial seal in an effort to deceive voters. Certain states have gone even further to 
specifi cally address the unauthorized use of a state seal in a political advertisement or campaign. On the other hand, 
there are a few states that do not broadly prohibit the unauthorized use of a state seal and only prohibit the use of a 
state seal for advertising or a commercial purpose. The state laws referenced above are summarized in more detail 
below and in the corresponding chart entitled “State Laws Regarding Unauthorized Use of State Seals and Insignia.”
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PROHIBITING USE OF STATE SEAL FOR COMMERCIAL V. NON-COMMERCIAL PURPOSE
A few states such as Alaska, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and South Dakota prohibit the use of their state seals for 
advertising or a commercial purpose. Such state laws do not appear to be applicable to disenfranchisement efforts 
unless there is some other commercial purpose to such efforts. All of the other states that have laws regarding the 
unauthorized use of state seals do not limit such laws to prohibiting the use of a state seal for a commercial purpose. 
Accordingly, the unauthorized use of such a state seal in an effort to disenfranchise voters via websites, email 
communications or otherwise could presumably fall within these states’ statutes.
PROHIBITING USE OF STATE SEAL ON DOCUMENTS V. ELECTRONIC SOURCES
A few states limit their laws regarding the unauthorized use of a state seal to use of the state seal on a document. For 
instance, in relevant part, Florida prohibits sending any letter, paper or document which simulates the state seal with 
the intent to mislead. FLA. STAT. § 817.38(1). On its face, Florida’s law does not appear to apply to websites or email 
communications.
A number of states, however, have state laws regarding the unauthorized use of a state seal that broadly prohibit the 
unauthorized/improper use of such seal and do not appear to be similarly limited. Such state laws presumably would 
cover disenfranchisement of voters via websites or email communications. For instance, such laws may prohibit the 
use of a state seal in connection with deceptive online and digital communications that bear a seal or insignia that 
is deceptively similar to an offi cial seal. Such state laws may be useful tools against false websites or electronic 
communications that use a state seal in order to convey the appearance of authenticity.
PROHIBITING USE OF A STATE SEAL IN A POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT/CAMPAIGN
A few states have laws that, under certain circumstances, prohibit the use of a state seal in a political advertisement 
or campaign. For instance, Washington prohibits the use of the state seal in political campaigns to assist/defeat 
any candidate. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.04.050. In addition, Texas makes it is a criminal offense for a person other than 
a political offi ceholder knowingly to use a representation of the state seal in political advertising. TEX. ELEC. CODE 
§ 255.006(d), (e) “‘Political advertising’ is defi ned as a communication supporting or opposing a candidate for 
nomination or election to a public offi ce or offi ce of a political party, a political party, a public offi cer, or a measure 
that (A) in return for consideration, is published in a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or is broadcast by radio 
or television; or (B) appears: (i) in a pamphlet, circular, fl ier, billboard or other sign, bumper sticker, or similar form 
of written communication; or (ii) on an Internet website.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 251.001(16). If any website or electronic 
communication incorporating the Texas state seal qualifi es as political advertising, it would be reached by this 
statute.
STATES WITH NO LAWS REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED USE OF STATE SEALS
Approximately half of the states do not have any laws regarding the unauthorized use of state seals and insignia. As 
referenced above, see the corresponding chart entitled “State Laws Regarding Unauthorized Use of State Seals and 
Insignia” for the identifi cation of such states.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the existing state laws regarding the unauthorized use of state seals, the following is recommended:
• States without laws prohibiting the unauthorized use of their state seals should enact laws that cover the 
unauthorized use of their state seals, explicitly prohibiting the unauthorized use of their state seals a) online or by 
other electronic means and b) in connection with a political advertisement or political campaign.
• States with laws already prohibiting the unauthorized use of state seals that do not expressly relate to the use of 
a state seal in a political advertisement or political campaign should amend their laws to explicitly prohibit the 
unauthorized use of their state seals a) online or by other electronic means and b) in connection with a political 
advertisement or political campaign.
• States with laws already prohibiting the unauthorized use of state seals in connection with the use of a state seal 
in a political advertisement or political campaign should amend their laws to explicitly prohibit the unauthorized 
use of their state seals online or by other electronic means.
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State Laws Regarding Unauthorized Use of State Seals and Insignia
State Cannot use state 
seal for advertising 
or commercial 
purpose, unless 
obtain written 
permission
Prohibits persons 
other than political 
offi ceholders 
from using state 
seal in political 
advertising
Cannot use state 
seal, without 
obtaining 
permission, or 
otherwise allowed 
by statute
Cannot willfully 
use insignia of a 
state with intent 
of fraudulently 
impersonating a 
state
Only Secretary of 
State can use/affi x 
state seal
Prohibits 
counterfeiting seal 
of state, county, 
etc.
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
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State Cannot send 
paper document 
which simulates 
seal with intent 
to mislead to 
obtain more 
things of value
Prohibits 
unauthorized / 
improper use of 
state seal
Cannot affi x 
state seal on 
docs
Cannot register 
mark if it 
comprises state 
insignia
Prohibits false 
alteration of 
a gov’t record 
and use of/ 
tampering with 
a gov’t record
Prohibits use 
of state seal 
in political 
campaign to 
assist/ defeat 
any candidate
None
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY 1
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT 2
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
1: New York has a statute that prohibits intentional alteration of object to give it source of authorship it does not actually possess 
(could apply to creation of phony website or election information)
2: Vermont only has a statute regarding use of state seal for commemorative medals or for public displays not connected with any advertisements.
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State Abbreviation Statute Reference(s)
Alabama AL N/A
Alaska AK ALASKA STAT. TIT. 44, CH. 9
Arizona AZ ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-130
Arkansas AR N/A
California CA CAL. PENAL CODE § 538(g)
Colorado CO COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5-113 and 18-8-113
Connecticut CT CONN. GEN. STAT. CH. 942 § 53-153
Delaware DE N/A
District of Columbia DC N/A
Florida FL FLA. STAT. § 817.38(1)
Georgia GA GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-32(c)
Hawaii HI HAW. REV. STAT. § 5-6
Idaho ID IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-3603
Illinois IL N/A
Indiana IN N/A
Iowa IA IOWA CODE TIT. XVI, SUBTIT. 1, CH. 718.5
Kansas KS N/A
Kentucky KY N/A
Louisiana LA N/A
Maine ME N/A
Maryland MD MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 8-607
Massachusetts MA MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 264, § 5
Michigan MI N/A
Minnesota MN N/A
Mississippi MS N/A
Missouri MO N/A
Montana MT N/A
Nebraska NE N/A
Nevada NV NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 235.010
New Hampshire NH N/A
New Jersey NJ N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:2-4
New Mexico NM N/A
New York NY N/A
North Carolina NC N/A
North Dakota ND N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-02
Ohio OH N/A
Oklahoma OK N/A
Oregon OR OR. REV. STAT. § 186.023
Pennsylvania PA N/A
Rhode Island RI R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-15-4
South Carolina SC N/A
South Dakota SD S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-6-3.1
Tennessee TN TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-504
Texas TX TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001(16) and 255.006(d), (e)
Utah UT UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-512
Vermont VT N/A
Virginia VA VA. CODE ANN. § 1-505
Washington WA WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.04.040 and 43.04.050
West Virginia WV W. VA. CODE § 61-4-2
Wisconsin WI N/A
Wyoming WY N/A
IV. ANTI-HACKING AND COMPUTER CRIMES LAWS
Each of the 50 states has some form of computer crimes or anti-hacking laws on the books.17 Most states broadly prohibit 
any unauthorized access to a computer, for any purpose. Almost without exception, these laws could be creatively applied 
to hacking or to any use of spyware that would redirect search queries or deny voters access to legitimate websites. There 
are many ways in which these laws could be expanded, from proscribing harsher penalties to covering different types 
of electronic devices and deceptive behaviors. Presently, many states reserve their harshest penalties for unauthorized 
access to a computer that results in damage, involves certain types of malicious intent, or interferes with vital 
government or public services. It is not always clear whether these laws would apply to online deceptive practices. Finally, 
13 states have stand-alone statutes specifi cally prohibiting the installation and use of spyware.
LAWS PROHIBITING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO A COMPUTER OR NETWORK 
The most common form of computer crimes law prohibits, at minimum, any “unauthorized access” to a computer, 
computer system, or computer network. In most states, the unauthorized access is illegal regardless of the 
defendant’s intentions or damage caused. It seems clear that most spyware and hacking activities would qualify 
as “unauthorized access” and would be illegal, because this type of online deceptive practice usually involves the 
clandestine installation of software on the voter’s computer.
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A small number of states require that the perpetrator actually “use” the victim’s computer in some way before 
triggering a penalty. Even in these states, the installation of software would likely qualify as “use” of the voter’s 
computer, because the perpetrator is using the voter’s computer to redirect search queries or domain names. The 
application of generic “unauthorized access” laws to electronic voting fraud is in question only in a few states. In 
eight jurisdictions, penalties are available only if the perpetrators intended to cause some type of damage. In these 
states, prosecutors must prove that the perpetrators’ access was not only unauthorized, but that it was accompanied 
by a specifi ed level of intent (e.g., malicious intent, intent to defraud, etc .).
In addition to the baseline unauthorized access laws, most jurisdictions have also defi ned several more serious 
computer crimes. These statutes typically carry enhanced penalties, but it is not always clear whether voter deception 
tactics would be actionable under these provisions. Categories of computer crime are generally distinguished based 
on the following considerations:
The perpetrator’s mental state (i.e., did the perpetrator act willfully, knowingly, maliciously, or with intent to 
defraud?).
Whether the perpetrator caused any damage to the computer, or to the computer’s owner.
The amount and type of damage caused.
Whether the unauthorized access interfered with certain public services (e.g., medical or emergency services).
Whether the access was designed to facilitate identity theft.
Punishments for unauthorized access vary signifi cantly from state to state and may become more severe based on the 
above considerations. In general, jurisdictions treat mere “unauthorized access” as a misdemeanor-level offense.
The names used by each state to describe the computer crime laws also vary signifi cantly. Some examples include:
Arizona: “Computer tampering.”
Alabama: “Offenses against intellectual property.”
Kentucky: “Unlawful access to a computer.”
Montana: “Unlawful use of a computer.”
Oregon: “Computer crime.”
Washington: “Computer trespass.”
OPTIONS FOR EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF LAWS ALREADY ON THE BOOKS
Although the great majority of the unauthorized access laws can be applied to deceptive practices based on their 
plain meaning, a creative prosecutor could interpret the following commonly-used statutory terms so as to enhance 
the penalties available against perpetrators.
“Scheme or artifi ce to defraud”: This phrase could be defi ned to include schemes to defraud a voter of his or her 
constitutional right to vote. At present, most states treat fraud as a purely fi nancial or property-based crime. An 
expansive interpretation of fraud could include schemes to deprive persons of their civil rights as well as schemes to 
defraud persons of property. In many states, proving a perpetrator’s intent to defraud opens the door to much harsher 
penalties than for mere unauthorized access to a voter’s computer.
Spotlight on Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania presents a good example of the types of behaviors contemplated by state computer crimes laws. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7611 prohibits mere unauthorized access or use of a computer. Section 7612, on the other 
hand, prohibits any scheme to block or impede a user’s access to computer services. Other sections prohibit 
the theft of data (§ 7613), possession of unauthorized copies of computer data (§ 7614), and any unauthorized 
interference with another person’s computer (§ 7615). Someone who hacked into a computer or used spyware to 
redirect search queries could be prosecuted under any of these sections. Each of these offenses is a third degree 
felony, subject to up to seven years’ imprisonment.
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“Computer, computer system, or computer network”: This phrase could be defi ned to include all sorts of electronic 
devices, including PDAs and cell phones. As the variety of devices capable of connecting with the internet expands, 
computer crimes laws should be expanded to keep pace with technology.
“Interference with governmental operations”: At present, seven states allow for enhanced penalties if unauthorized 
access to a computer interrupts or interferes with a “governmental operation.” At present it is unclear whether an 
election would be considered a governmental operation. Some states seem to focus on vital public and governmental 
services such as police, fi re and emergency medical services, and will only enhance penalties if the perpetrator’s 
actions put the public at risk.
Another option for strengthening the deterrent effect of the already broad unauthorized access laws is to defi ne each 
redirected search query or installation of software as a separate, chargeable offense. Very few states defi ne what 
constitutes a single chargeable event. South Carolina treats each affected computer as a separate violation. S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-16-20(5). Tennessee groups all of the violations resulting from any single action and treats them as 
one chargeable event. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5204(e). If a prosecutor were willing to take a more expansive view, she 
could charge each redirected search query or each installation of software as a separate offense. Even though the 
maximum fi nes and jail times are generally low for unauthorized access to a computer, these penalties could quickly 
add up if violators were charged separately for each offense.
Many states reserve the harshest penalties for computer crimes that result in signifi cant fi nancial loss. In these 
jurisdictions, fi nes and jail time escalate depending on the amount of monetary damage caused by the perpetrator. 
Because it is diffi cult to attach a dollar value to one’s voting rights, however, penalties based on the amount of 
monetary loss are not easily applied to online deceptive practices. Instead, states should expand the harshest penalty 
provisions to include computer crimes that disrupt elections or interfere with voting rights.
 
Similarly, many states have laws restricting the creation of false websites, or the transmission of messages from 
false addresses. At present, these laws focus almost exclusively on the collection of identifying personal fi nancial 
information (credit card numbers, bank account numbers, etc.), and could not easily be applied to the deceptive 
practices context. With a little tweaking, however, these laws could be used to prosecute individuals who create phony 
Secretary of State websites, or send false information about polling places. Because the framework is already there, it 
is just a matter of expanding these laws to address non-commercial deceptive practices.
Spotlight on Louisiana
Louisiana’s Anti-Phishing Law is a good example of a web-crimes statute that is prohibitively limited to 
the commercial context. LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 2022 prohibits the creation of a web page or a domain name for 
fraudulent purposes. Unfortunately, the offense is only chargeable if the defendant created the website with the 
intent to collect identifying information (a term of art, narrowly limited to fi nancial data) about the computer 
user.
STATES WITH INNOVATIVE LAWS
Several states have stepped outside of the “unauthorized access” computer crimes mold and have enacted 
innovative electronic “false statements” laws that may be applicable to online deceptive practices other than mere 
“unauthorized access.”
Spotlight on Ohio
Ohio’s “defraud” defi nition is a model for broad applicability of the computer crimes laws. “ ‘Defraud’ means to 
knowingly obtain, by deception, some benefi t for oneself or another, or to knowingly cause, by deception, some 
detriment to another.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.01(B). There is a strong argument that the loss of one’s voting 
rights would qualify as a detriment to the voter under this defi nition.
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Georgia: Georgia prohibits the transmission of any data over the internet that includes false identifi cation or 
representation. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 This statute is not limited to the commercial context, and explicitly prohibits 
the use of a logo or legal or offi cial seal. Prosecutors in Georgia would have no trouble using this law to go after 
individuals creating phony Secretary of State websites, or individuals who send e-mails purportedly from the Election 
Board, police department, or other offi cial source. A 1997 United States District Court opinion enjoined the application 
of this statute on First Amendment grounds (American Civil Liberties Union of Georgia v. Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997)), but the statute remains on the books and may still be enforceable in Georgia state courts.
Mississippi: Mississippi broadly prohibits the posting of any message through electronic media for the purpose 
of causing injury to any person. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-17. If spyware is installed on a voter’s computer with the 
intention of causing injury (either by keeping that voter from exercising his or her constitutional right to vote, or by 
infl uencing the voter to vote for a candidate through fraudulent means), this statute could be used to prosecute those 
online deceptive practices. 
Ohio: Ohio prohibits tampering with electronic writings or records, and also punishes the transmission or use of 
falsifi ed electronic documents. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.42. At present, this statute has primarily been used to 
prosecute corruption and schemes to defraud the government (e.g., money laundering and theft in offi ce, submission 
of false daily activity reports, etc.). But it could conceivably be used to prosecute creators of false offi cial websites or 
senders of false e-mails from candidates, election authorities, or other offi cial sources.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania’s generic computer crimes statute contains a prohibition on unauthorized access to a 
website or telecommunications device. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7611(a)(2). Pennsylvania also prohibits schemes to disrupt 
service to a website. PA. CONS. STAT. § 7612. This broad defi nition of unauthorized access covers online deceptive 
practices without requiring installation of software onto the voter’s computer. As hacking techniques evolve and 
become more sophisticated, this type of broad-based defi nition may be necessary.
Rhode Island: In Rhode Island, the intentional transmission of false data for any purpose is illegal. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
11-52-7. This law could be used to prosecute anyone who creates a false website or sends an e-mail with false voting 
information.
Tennessee: It is illegal to duplicate or mimic any portion of a website in Tennessee. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5203(c). 
The statute also prohibits false use of a trademark, logo, or name on a website, as well as the creation of false links 
that redirect users to a different website. This law would easily cover most online deceptive practices that do not 
involve unauthorized access to the voter’s computer.
STATES WITH SPYWARE LAWS
Although spyware could be prosecuted under most states’ generic computer crimes laws, 13 states have stand-alone 
statutes specifi cally addressing spyware. These statutes generally prohibit installation of software that does one or all 
of the following things:
Modifi es browser settings.
Collects personal identifying or fi nancial information.
Collects keystroke information.
Prevents removal of the software.
Misrepresents that the software has been removed.
Modifi es security settings on the user’s computer.
Takes control of the computer in some way.
The uniformity of state law on this issue indicates that many states are following some form of model statute to enact 
their spyware laws. A representative example of this model statute format is ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-7301 et seq. An 
example of a particularly ineffective spyware law is ALASKA STAT. § 45.45-.792 et seq. Alaska prohibits only spyware that 
causes pop-up ads to appear on the user’s computer screen.
In general, the states that have spyware laws would be good test-states for prosecuting online deceptive practices 
involving use of spyware. Although the unauthorized access statutes would likely also cover this deceptive behavior, 
the statutory violation in states with spyware laws would seem to be easier to prosecute.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
• Most states’ generic computer crimes laws could apply to spyware, but it would be better if this were not left up to 
prosecutors to decide.  States that do not have separate laws could generally benefi t from having a separate, well-
defi ned statute prohibiting spyware.  
• State fraud statutes should explicitly address fraud related to voting rights (most states focus only on fi nancial 
harm, not on harm to the victim’s constitutional rights).
• Statutory defi nitions of computers, computer systems, and/or computer networks should be expanded to include cell 
phones, blackberries, and other portable electronic devices.
• Computer crimes committed with intent to disrupt an election should be subject to harsher penalties than other 
types of “unauthorized access” to a computer.  For example, statutes should provide enhanced penalties for 
interference with essential government functions and should make clear that an election is included within that 
defi nition.  The existence of enhanced penalties increases the deterrent effect of these laws.
• Many states have anti-spyware and anti-phishing statutes that apply only in the commercial context.  These laws 
should be expanded to cover non-fi nancial online criminal activity. 
• States should enact laws explicitly prohibiting interference with web sites (see e.g. Pa. Cons. Stat. sections 7611(a)
(2) and 7612).  Current computer crimes laws focus on interference with an actual computer, and may not cover 
unauthorized access to a website. 
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State
Unauthorized 
access 
prohibited
No additional 
minimum 
behavior 
requirements
Additional 
protection 
from online 
deceptive 
practices
Enhanced 
penalties for 
interference 
with 
governmental 
operations
Private cause 
of action
Separate 
spyware 
statute
No state law
AL
AK
AZ
AR 1
CA
CO
CT 2
DE
DC
FL
GA 3
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA
KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS 4
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH 5
OK
OR
PA 6
RI 7
SC
SD
TN 8
TX
UT 9
VT
VA
WA
WV 10
WI 11
WY
1: Prosecuting attorney may ask for Attorney General’s assistance to investigate and/or prosecute this crime. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-107.
2: Attorney General may bring a civil enforcement action. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-453.
3:   Use of a false name, logo, seal, or symbol to identify oneself in a computer transmission is prohibited. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1. Attorney General and district 
attorney have power to investigate computer crimes. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-108 and 16-9-109.
4:   Posting a message in electronic media with the intent to cause injury to another person is prohibited. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-17.
5:   Falsifying electronic records or writing with intent to defraud is prohibited. OHIO REV. CODE § 2913.42. The computer crimes laws also contain enhanced penalties for 
falsifying government records or writings.
6:   Unauthorized access to a World Wide Web site or telecommunication device is also prohibited.
7:   Intentional transmission of false data for any purpose is prohibited. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-52-7.
8:   Unauthorized duplication or mimicking of a website is prohibited. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-5203(c).
9:   Individuals have an affi rmative duty to report violations of the computer crimes laws. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-705. Utah also directs the Attorney General, county and 
district attorneys to prosecute computer crimes laws. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-704.
10: False documents transmitted via computer can be prosecuted under the forgery laws. W. Va. Code § 61-3C-15.
11: Penalties are enhanced for defendants who conceal that identity and location of their computer.
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V. DISTRIBUTION VIA SPAM EMAIL OF FALSE INFORMATION ABOUT VOTING 
MECHANICS
A majority of states have enacted legislation aimed at curbing unsolicited bulk electronic mail (“e-mail”); however, 
most of these statutes are designed to protect consumers. Many of these statutes can be found in their respective 
state’s consumer protection laws. These statutes generally prohibit the unsolicited distribution of e-mails that are 
“commercial” in nature and do not apply to non-commercial activities. Commercial e-mails are generally defi ned in 
these statutes as electronic messages with the purpose of promoting real property, goods or services for sale or lease. 
Accordingly, without some commercial component in the e-mails, it is unlikely that the distribution of spam e-mail 
used to spread false information about candidates or voting mechanics would violate these statutes. 
A number of states have not enacted any legislation regarding unsolicited bulk or commercial electronic mail. These 
states include Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, South Carolina and Vermont. However, many of these states rely on the Controlling the Assault of 
Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act, or the CAN SPAM Act. The CAN-SPAM Act took effect on January 1, 2004 
and requires unsolicited commercial e-mail messages to be labeled (though not by a standard method) and to include 
opt-out instructions and the sender’s physical address. It prohibits the use of deceptive subject lines and false 
headers in such messages. The Federal Trade Commission is authorized (but not required) to establish a “do-not-
email” registry. State laws that require labels on unsolicited commercial e-mail or prohibit such messages entirely 
are pre-empted, although provisions merely addressing falsity and deception would remain in place. However, the CAN 
SPAM Act appears to protect individuals from unsolicited commercial e-mails, and therefore is unlikely to apply to the 
distribution of spam email to spread false information about candidates or voting mechanics.
There are some states, however, whose anti-spam laws may reach non-commercial activity. For example, in Virginia, 
it is illegal to send unsolicited bulk e-mail containing falsifi ed routing information, if the sender thereby violates 
a provider’s policies, or distributes software designed to falsify routing information. Va. Code §18.2-152.3:1 
(Transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail). The statute does not distinguish between commercial and non-
commercial activity and was amended in April 2003 to increase the penalties for sending a high volume of messages 
containing falsifi ed routing information. 
Nevada is another state whose anti-spam laws are not limited to e-mails that are commercial in nature. In Nevada it 
is a misdemeanor to willfully falsify or forge any data information, image, program, signal or sound that is contained 
in the header, subject line or routing instructions of an item of electronic mail with the intent to transmit or cause to 
be transmitted the item of electronic mail to any Internet or network site or to the electronic mail address of one or 
more recipients without their knowledge of or consent to the transmission. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §205.492. Furthermore, 
if a violation of this subsection causes an interruption or impairment of a public service, the person may be guilty of a 
category C Felony. 
Lastly, many states prohibit the unauthorized use of a computer or a computer network to send unsolicited bulk 
email containing falsifi ed routing information. The unlawful sale or distribution of software designed to facilitate 
falsifi cation of electronic mail or routing information is also prohibited in many of these states. Persons or entities 
who distribute spam e-mail to spread false information about candidates or voting mechanics may violate these 
statutes but only if the sender a) accesses a computer or computer network without authorization, or b) distributes 
software that is designed to facilitate falsifi cation of electronic mail or routing information. States that have enacted 
laws similar to these are Connecticut, Iowa, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Texas.
The statutes referenced above are summarized in more detail in the corresponding chart entitled “State Anti-Spam 
Statutes”.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Most states do not have adequate or any legislation that address the concerns implicated by deceptive practices 
and voter intimidation through electronic mail. The states and the Federal Government would benefi t greatly by 
adopting legislation specifi cally targeted toward addressing these issues.
• New legislation must be tailored to so as to not be pre-empted by the CAN SPAM Act. This is easily accomplished 
since the CAN SPAM Act revolves around “commercial” activity.
• New legislation must be fl exible enough to encompass the various mediums of sending electronic messages such 
as e-mail, text messages and other forms of digital transmissions over the internet and wireless networks. 
• New legislation should also be broad enough to anticipate new forms of electronic distribution.
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• The type of prohibited activity should include knowingly distributing false information regarding (1) the time, place, 
or manner of conducting state elections; (2) the qualifi cations for or restrictions on voter eligibility for any such 
election; and (3) false information regarding candidates.
• New legislation should be clearly delineated, preferably, in the state’s already existing election laws. Currently, 
a few state’s computer crime laws may be broad enough to prosecute those who use spam mail to spread false 
information about voting mechanics, however, any ambiguity about the application of the laws currently adopted by 
the states would be cleared up by specifi cally prohibiting the abuse of false or misleading spam-mail in the states 
already existing election laws.
State State has 
Anti-Spam 
Legislation 
Specifi cally 
Enumerated 
in Election 
Laws
Sate Has 
Anti-Spam 
Legislation 
Enumerated 
in Computer 
/Criminal 
Laws
State Has 
Anti-Spam 
Legislation 
Enumerated 
in Consumer 
Protection 
Laws
State Has No 
Anti-Spam 
Laws
Anti-Spam 
Laws ONLY 
Prohibit 
Commercial 
Activity
Anti-Spam 
Laws 
Prohibit Non-
Commercial 
Activity
Statute May 
Be Used 
To Prohibit 
False 
Information 
Re: Voting 
Mechanics*
Prohibits 
the misrep. 
of the point 
of origin 
or routing 
information
States 
that have 
relied on/
pre-empted 
by the CAN 
SPAM Act 
(Commercial 
Activity) 
General 
Election 
Laws May 
Be Broad 
Enough To 
Prohibit 
Deceptive 
Spam Re 
Elections
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT * *
DE  *  *
DC
FL
GA
HI
ID
IL
IN
IA *** ***
KS * *
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND **
OH
OK
OR
PA * *
RI
SC
SD
TN * *
TX
UT
VT
VA * *
WA
WV
WI
WY
*Requires unauthorized access to a computer network and falsifi ed routing information.
**Statute criminalizes false and misleading emails, however, the false nature of the message must be used to induce the intended recipient to provide property or identifying information 
(“phishing”).
***Requires the intent to falsify or forge electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail 
Unauthorized access to a computer network is not required to prosecute under this particular statute. 
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Statute References
State Abbreviation Statute Reference(s)
Alabama AL N/A
Alaska AK Alaska Stat. § 45.50.479  (2008)
Arizona AZ Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1372..01(A) (2008)
Arkansas AR A.R.S. § 44-1372.01 (2008)
California CA Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17529.2 (2008)
Colorado CO C.R.S. 6-2.5-103 (2007)
Connecticut CT Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-451 (2008)
Delaware DE 11 Del. C. § 937 (2008)
District of Columbia DC N/A
Florida FL Fla. Stat. § 668.602 (2008)
Georgia GA O.C.G.A. § 16-9-101  (2008)
Hawaii HI N/A
Idaho ID Idaho Code § 48-603E  (2008)
Illinois IL 815 ILCS 511/10  (2008)
Indiana IN Ind. Code. § 24-5-22-8 (2008)
Iowa IA Iowa Code § 716A.2 (2008)
Kansas KS K.S.A. § 50-6,107 (2006)
Kentucky KY N/A
Louisiana LA La. R.S. 51:1741.2  (2008)
Maine ME N/A
Maryland MD
Md. CRIMINAL LAW Code Ann. § 3-805.1 (2008); Md. COMMERCIAL LAW Code Ann. § 14-3002 
(2008)
Massachusetts MA N/A
Michigan MI MCLS § 445.2504 (2008)
Minnesota MN Minn. State. § 325F.694 (2008)
Mississippi MS N/A
Missouri MO § 407.1135 to 407.1141 R.S.Mo.  (2008)
Montana MT N/A
Nebraska NE N/A
Nevada NV Nev. Rev. Stat. An. §§ 41.705 to 41.735 (2007)
New Hampshire NH N/A
New Jersey NJ N/A
New Mexico NM N/A
New York NY N/A
North Carolina NC N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-274  (2008)
North Dakota ND NDCC § 51-27-10
Ohio OH ORC Ann. 2307.64  (2008)
Oklahoma OK N/A
Oregon OR N/A
Pennsylvania PA 18 Pa.C.S. § 7661 (2008)
Rhode Island RI R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-47-2  (2008)
South Carolina SC N/A
South Dakota SD SDCL §§ 37-24-41 to 37-24-48 (20008)
Tennessee TN Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-603  (2008);
Texas TX Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 46.001 (20008)
Utah UT N/A
Vermont VT N/A
Virginia VA Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-152.3  (2008)
Washington WA Rev. Code Wash. (ARCW) §§ 19.190.005 to 19.90.110 (20008)
West Virginia WV W. Va. Code § 46A-6G-2  (2008)
Wisconsin WI Wis. Stat. § 947.0125 (2007)
Wyoming WY Wis. Stat. § 947.0125
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FEDERAL LAW
There is no clear authority as to whether federal law presently contains criminal penalties against deceptive practices. 
For example, a classic “dirty trick” is to post fl iers in targeted neighborhoods providing incorrect information about 
the date of an impending election. Even where a person posting such fl iers knows that information to be false, 
and regardless of how many voters are deceived, the current federal law may not subject that person to criminal 
prosecution or civil injunction. 
The most recent version of the Department of Justice’s manual for criminal election prosecutions states that:
Voter suppression schemes are designed to ensure the election of a favored candidate by blocking or 
impeding voters believed to oppose that candidate from getting to the polls to cast their ballots. Examples 
include providing false information to the public – or a particular segment of the public – regarding 
the qualifi cations to vote, the consequences of voting in connection with citizenship status, the dates 
or qualifi cations for absentee voting, the date of an election, the hours for voting, or the correct voting 
precinct. Currently there is no federal criminal statute that expressly prohibits this sort of voter suppression 
activity. 
United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Public Integrity Section, Federal Prosecution of Election 
Offenses, Seventh Edition (May 2007) at 61.  The manual goes on to state that:
The Criminal Division believes that the prosecution of voter suppression schemes represents an important 
law enforcement priority, that such schemes should be aggressively investigated, and that, until Congress 
enacts a statute specifi cally criminalizing this type of conduct, 18 U.S.C. § 241 is the appropriate prosecutive 
tool by which to charge provable offenses. 
Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses at 63. Under 18 U.S.C. § 241, it is a felony to “conspire to injure, oppress, 
threaten, or intimidate any person in any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or 
privilege secured by the Constitution or law of the United States.” The right to vote is a right that is protected under 
18 U.S.C. § 241. However, while the Department of Justice has brought one prosecution for phone-jamming under this 
theory, it has not brought any such cases for deceptive practices. The key question would likely be whether a deceptive 
practice constitutes an injury to the right to vote. The requirement of a criminal conspiracy also limits the reach of 
this as-yet-untested theory. 
In some cases deceptive information may be one aspect of a scheme to intimidate voters in violation of the Voting 
Rights Act. A prominent example of such a case involved the 1990 re-election campaign of then-Senator Jesse Helms 
of North Carolina. The Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division in the U.S. Department of Justice brought a case 
against the Helms campaign under Section 11(b), the principal civil anti-intimidation provision of the Voting Rights 
Act. The Justice Department charged that the Helms campaign had targeted heavily-black precincts with mailings 
that provided misleading information threatening criminal prosecution for voting. The case was settled by a consent 
decree prohibiting such targeted mailings. In the Helms case a deceptive practice was embedded within a larger 
scheme to intimidate targeted African-American voters. The deceptive practice itself did not constitute a separate 
claim. 
The substantive purpose of digital voter suppression will be the same as its lower-technology counterpart: that is, 
to furnish misleading information concerning voter qualifi cations, possible adverse consequences of voting, dates 
of elections, locations and hours of polling places, and the like. However, the use of the Internet and networked 
technologies for these purposes raises the possibility of recourse to statutes and regulations, such as the CAN-SPAM 
Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, that may not be available when more traditional methods are used.
As part of our research concerning statutes and regulations that furnish possible causes of action for digital voter 
suppression, we identifi ed the following potential federal remedies (apart from violations of federal election laws 
and civil rights laws): (1) copyright violations; (2) trademark violations; (3) anti-cybersquatting law violations; 
(4) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act violations; (5) Wire Fraud claims; and the (6) the CAN-SPAM Act. We also 
considered the availability of Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Act as a “shield” for liability of Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) and website operators for legal violations by persons using their facilities or services. 
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COPYRIGHT VIOLATIONS
A voter suppression campaign that sends emails or posts online information purporting to originate with a 
government agency or private organization might support a cause of action for copyright infringement.18 Such an 
action ordinarily may be brought by any person or entity (whether organized for profi t or otherwise) that owns or has 
license rights to the material that was misappropriated and may include requests for damages and/or injunctive 
relief, as appropriate.19 More rarely, violations of copyright are punished under the criminal provisions of the United 
States Code. 
Not all governmental organizations, however, may own copyrights and sue for infringement. The Copyright Act 
expressly disclaims copyright protection for “any work of the United States Government . . .,”20 and also may prevent 
state and local governments from claiming protection for statutes or other “edicts of government” to which citizens 
are entitled to have unrestricted access.21 However, state or local governments that publish materials other than 
“edicts of government,” along with private organizations (whether or not organized for profi t) may bring civil actions 
under the Copyright Act.
Where allegedly infringing materials are placed on the Internet, an important supplement to traditional copyright 
remedies is provided by section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which permits rights holders 
to ask website hosts and other providers of online services promptly to take down, or disable access to, infringing 
materials posted to their services by customers or others.22 Compliance with DMCA requests is not mandatory, but 
such compliance does give online service providers certain immunity from copyright infringement claims, and most 
reputable online companies has a policy of complying with DMCA requests. For this reason, and because the DMCA 
provides an expedited remedy that does not require the claimant to locate and serve the (often-elusive) provider of 
the misleading information, the DMCA process is a promising tool for stopping a voter suppression campaign that 
misappropriates copyright material.
Recommendations
Litigation Strategies
Except for the unlikely event of a criminal prosecution, copyright remedies must be sought by the holder of one of the 
exclusive rights (reproduction, public display, public distribution, etc.) recognized by the Copyright Act. Recommended 
relief might include a suit for injunctive relief and/or damages. Also, a take-down demand under the DMCA, directed 
to the website host or other online service provider that made the infringing material available is also an option. The 
summary DMCA procedure is quick and does not require the Committee or the rights holder to identify and serve a 
complaint upon the creator of the infringing content.
As noted earlier, copyright claims brought by federal agencies might be dismissed as prohibited by copyright law, 
but claims on behalf of state and local governmental agencies and private parties are not barred, at least where the 
materials for which protection is claimed are not statutes or other “edicts of government” published by or on behalf of 
governmental bodies.23 
Legislative
The rights granted by the Copyright Act are generally adequate to the purpose of responding to misuse of materials 
owned by local elections boards, political parties, advocacy groups and other entities for voter suppression purposes. 
The only signifi cant limitation that might be addressed by statutory amendment is the exception from copyright 
protection for certain governmental works. This exception, however, is based upon the strong policy concern that tax-
payer funded works of authorship should be freely available to the public. Unless a statutory amendment is confi ned 
specifi cally to cases in which a work of government is exploited for fraud or other wrongful purposes, a proposed 
amendment to the Copyright Act to close this loophole will have little prospect of success.  
FEDERAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS
Persons or organizations engaged in online voter deception might use the seals, insignia, names or other devices of 
governmental organizations, charitable organizations or political parties in order to confuse voters as to the origin of 
email messages or materials posted on spurious websites. Even where those misappropriations are not suffi ciently 
extensive to support copyright infringement claims, they might give rise to causes of action under trademark law. 
Trademarks, service marks and trade names are names, symbols and other devices used by makers and vendors of 
goods to distinguish their products from those made and sold by others.24 When a person has adopted and used a 
trademark in commerce, he or she may prevent others from using that trademark in ways that cause confusion as to 
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the origin of goods or that harm the property rights associated with the trademark. Remedies are available under the 
common law of unfair competition and under federal law under the Lanham Act.
Recommendations 
Litigation
 First, federal law precludes trademark registration of “the fl ag, or coat of arms, or other insignia” of federal, state, 
local or foreign governments.25  Accordingly, a phony website that used such governmental insignia to mislead voters 
would not, on that basis alone, trigger a cause of action for trademark infringement. 
However, federal, state and local governments may own and assert infringement of certifi cation marks used to identify 
the source of government-supplied goods and services.26 Accordingly, a governmental body might have a federal 
trademark infringement claim for misuse of a mark associated with a good or service supplied by that agency. 
Protection under federal trademark and common-law unfair competition law also is available for the names and 
marks of non-profi t charitable groups, political groups and religious institutions.27
In some cases brought under federal trademark law, however, courts have denied protection to particular non-profi t 
groups on the ground that those groups’ activities did not use their marks “in commerce” or in connection with 
“goods or services.”28 
Also, even where the “commerce” requirement is satisfi ed, a claim for trademark infringement by a non-profi t 
organization must satisfy the usual requirements for an infringement claim, including likelihood of confusion. 
Legislative
The Lanham Act provides generally that: 
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant . . . use in commerce any reproduction, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any 
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive, . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.29 
The requirement that a mark be used in commerce has caused some confusion as to the trademark rights of political, 
charitable and nonprofi t organizations, especially where those groups do not engage in membership drives or 
fundraising activities.30 An amendment to the Lanham Act, providing that use in commerce includes use of a mark to 
identify an organization engaged in any lawful, ongoing activity, would clarify the availability of trademark protection 
for nonprofi ts of all kinds. 
ANTI-CYBERSQUATTING VIOLATIONS
An impostor that creates a deceptive website will want to ensure that online searches for the legitimate site will result 
in “hits” for the phony site. The most effective way to achieve this goal is to register a URL that is similar to that of 
the legitimate site, or that uses a name or mark similar to that of the organization the impostor seeks to impersonate.
Registration of an Internet domain name that is confusingly similar to a name or mark of an unrelated organization 
may be challenged in two ways: by a lawsuit brought under the Anticyberquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”),31 
or by recourse to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).32 
Relief under the ACPA, which requires recourse to the courts, has largely been displaced in practice by the effi cient 
arbitration procedures available under the UDRP. The UDRP is an arbitration-based dispute resolution policy adopted 
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). All persons who apply to register a domain 
name, or ask a registrar to maintain or renew a domain name registration, are required to warrant that: (a) the 
statements made in the registration agreement are complete and accurate; (b) that to the registrant’s knowledge, the 
registration of the domain name will not infringe upon or otherwise violate the rights of any third party; (c) that the 
registrant is not registering the domain name for any unlawful purpose; and (d) that the registrant will not knowingly 
use the domain name in violation of any applicable laws or regulations.33 
Domain name registrants also agree that in the event certain complaints are made concerning their use of a domain 
name, they will submit to a mandatory arbitration procedure. A fi nding that the complaint is meritorious may lead to 
cancellation or transfer of the registrant’s domain name. 
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Recommendations 
Litigation
First, there should be no reason for an aggrieved party to use the cumbersome procedure of the ACPA when the 
UDRP procedure is available. If an organization becomes aware of an apparent misuse of a domain name for voter 
suppression purposes, it should notify one of the domain name dispute resolution providers approved by ICANN, such 
as the National Arbitration Forum or the World Intellectual Property Organization.34
Second, in stating its complaint under the UDRP, the organization should emphasize any evidence that the bad-
faith registrant intended to disrupt the complainant’s operations generally or the orderly conduct of an election in 
particular. The UDRP is tailored primarily to reach misuse of trademarks by competitors for commercial purposes, 
but permits a general claim of “disrupting the business of a competitor” that at least one arbitrator has upheld as 
applied to a registrant’s attempt to disrupt elections.35
Legislative
Both the ACPA and the UDRP are aimed primarily at domain name registrations that exploit trademarks to the 
detriment of commercial competitors. Both would benefi t from amendments that recognize misuse of domain names 
to mislead and confuse for noncommercial purposes.
Changes to the UDRP procedure, which is nonstatutory and has taken the larger role in domain name enforcement 
would have an even greater practical effect. Specifi cally, it would be worthwhile for ICANN to add an additional 
ground of liability, such as registration “primarily for the purpose of disrupting the right of others to engage in lawful 
conduct.”
COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) prohibits the hacking into, or the use of worms, viruses and other 
malware to infi ltrate government computers or websites.36 The CFAA also makes it illegal to hack into private parties’ 
computers, so long as the intrusion causes certain kinds of cognizable harm.37 
Recommendations
Litigation
The principal limitation on private rights of action under the CFAA is the requirement for proof of more than $5,000 
in damages for any one-year period.  The Act limits damages for losses to economic loss only (and does not allow 
recovery for death, personal injury, mental distress, and the like); but “damages for loss of business and business 
goodwill” are recoverable as economic damages. Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com, LLC.38 Moreover, “[w]hen an 
individual or fi rm’s money or property are impaired in value, or money or property is lost, or money must be spent to 
restore or maintain some aspect of a business affected by a violation, those are ‘economic damages.’”39 Accordingly, 
it may be that a loss in reputation and business goodwill (perhaps indicated by reduced web traffi c?) of a voter 
registration or information site provides legitimate grounds for a CFAA cause of action. The damages will, however, 
need to be quantifi able, which may be diffi cult to prove in the context of nonprofi t voter information sites
Legislation
Elimination of the $5,000 damages threshold, or expansion of the categories of damages recognized to include 
noneconomic harms, would expand the usefulness of the CFAA to public interest groups. 
THE WIRE FRAUD STATUTE
The federal crime of wire fraud is codifi ed at 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Mail fraud and wire fraud both are proved by 
showing a scheme or artifi ce to defraud, combined with either mailing or electronic communication for purpose of 
executing the scheme.40 In addition, the falsehood must be material.41 Wire fraud has been found to apply to Internet 
communication.42 
Recommendations
Litigation
There is no private right of action for violations of the wire fraud statute. Accordingly, any organization aggrieved by 
voter suppression actions that involve wire fraud would have to refer the matter to law enforcement.
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Most frequently, mail and wire fraud apply to attempts to defraud a person of money or property. However, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 extends the category of applicable fraud objectives to the attempt to deprive a person of “honest services” 
besides property. However, since 1987, all courts but one (DeFries, below) have refused to apply wire fraud or this 
“honest services” argument to prosecutions of election fraud or deprivation of the “right to an honest election” under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 or 1343. See United States v. Turner, 459 F.3d 775 (2006) (stating that § 1346, adopted after a 
1987 Supreme Court case invalidated the use of mail and wire fraud to prosecute election fraud, does not apply in the 
election fraud context). In fact, there is legislative history supporting the notion that Congress never intended the wire 
fraud statute to criminalize the deprivation of “inhabitants of a State, or political subdivision of a State, of a fair and 
impartially conducted election process,” since that provision was proposed in the Anti-Corruption Act of 1988 around 
the time of the § 1346 addition, and was ultimately rejected. 134 Cong. Rec. S16315-01, 1988 WL 177972 (daily ed. 
Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Biden).
There also appears to be no caselaw or legislative history expressly supporting the argument that the wire fraud 
statute may be used where the fraud deprives a person of the use of their computer equipment or services to 
receive email messages. Indeed, such limited deprivation may not rise to the appropriate level of materiality. If a 
problematic election infl uenced by fraudulent behavior results in additional costs, however, it might satisfy the 
requisite requirement of harm. See United States v. DeFries, 43 F.3d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a scheme to 
cast fraudulent ballots in a labor union election tainted the entire election, and was a scheme to defraud the election 
authority charged with running the election of the costs involved). 
SECTION 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
In many cases, the persons who actually create false websites and populate them with deceptive information may 
be diffi cult to locate. If the website hosting companies or other online service providers are suspected of complicity 
with the impostors or of negligence in permitting them to operate, aggrieved parties might usefully consider bringing 
actions those service providers. 
Where such a claim is based upon intellectual property theories, there is no impediment to the claim if the elements 
of direct, vicarious or contributory infringement can be made out. If the claims are be based upon other grounds 
of liability, however, Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Act,43 which states that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider” must be taken into consideration. The courts have interpreted this language as 
providing a comprehensive, if not impregnable, barrier against an online service provider’s liability for harmful 
material posted by others that does not involve violations of copyright or other intellectual property rights.
 
Recommendations
Litigation
Because of the section 230 exemptions, and because of the cost and delay of litigation generally, an aggrieved 
party’s fi rst approach to a website host or other service provider should be a request to disable or remove offending 
material voluntarily. Deceptive sites that facilitate voter suppression will be contrary to the terms of use of all or most 
reputable online service providers, and most businesses will be eager to disassociate themselves from such activity.
In the event that litigation aimed at a service provider appears necessary, the plaintiff should assess the degree of 
the provider’s involvement with creating the offending content, and whether the third-party material involves any 
colorable intellectual property violations that will not be covered by the section 230 exception. However the complaint 
is framed, the plaintiff must be prepared to respond to a prompt motion to dismiss under section 230.
Legislative
Section 230, as expansively interpreted by the courts, is a deeply fl awed statute that has been persuasively criticized 
as fostering irresponsible practices by website hosts and online publishers. Section 230 should be amended. 
CAN-SPAM ACT OF 2003
Email messages that purport to be from governmental agencies, non-profi t organizations that endorse candidates 
and other senders, but that in fact are sent by persons hoping to mislead voters, should be scrutinized for possible 
violations of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003.44
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Recommendations
Legislative
The CAN-SPAM Act has been widely criticized for its lack of effectiveness in dealing with abusive email marketing 
practices. Most of those criticisms fault the statute’s failure to prohibit all commercial email that recipients have not 
specifi cally requested. 
With respect to online deceptive practices, the statute’s primary fl aw is its limitation to messages that promote 
the sale of commercial products or services. The law should be amended to expand the defi nition of “commercial 
electronic mail message,” or prohibit misleading practices engaged in by senders and initiators of noncommercial 
email.
CONCLUSION
In addition to the recommendations made throughout this report, there are steps that can be taken before the election 
to try to defray the potential damage of online deceptive practices.
First, law enforcement, especially attorneys general, district attorneys and the United States Department of Justice 
should make clear that these acts will be treated seriously and prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Press 
statements to this effect should be broadly disseminated before Election Day.
As related at the outset of this report, both Republicans and Democrats have been victimized by e-deceptive practices 
campaigns. For example, during the primaries a series of false campaign websites materialized that appeared to 
be legitimate, such as FredThomsonForum.com, RudyGiulianiForum.com, and MittRomneyforum.com. These sites 
featured posts with misinformation by people impersonating known pundits and promoted links that appeared to be 
candidate sites that actually routed users to YouTube videos attacking them. 45 The McCain-Romney.com website took 
viewers to the “offi cial home of the Hundred Year War…and Bush’s Third Term!”46 
Yet, as the most frequent target of viral deceptive information in the context of the political campaign, Barack 
Obama’s operation devised some methods for combating them that may provide voting rights advocates some 
lessons. 
For example, the Obama campaign established a link on its campaign web site that addresses the rumors and 
fi ghts fraud with fact. On this site www.fi ghtthesmears.com, the Obama campaign provided concise, bulleted points 
of attack under each summarized smear headline followed by the truth which allows readers to quickly ascertain 
the facts. From here the reader could continue on and delve into each instance of lies or rumor for a more detailed 
description of the facts.
Secretaries of State and other election administrators can utilize such methods, as has already been done by the 
Maryland Board of Elections. At http://www.elections.state.md.us/, the Board has a section on the site called “Rumor 
Control.” The page looks like the following: 
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RUMOR CONTROL
Get the Facts!
Foreclosure
Rumor: If my home is in foreclosure, will I be allowed to vote? 
FACT: Maryland’s Constitution (Art. I, § 1) guarantees each citizen who is 18 years old and a resident of the State 
the right to vote. The fact that your home is in foreclosure has no bearing on your right to vote. It may, however, 
effect where you vote. If you have left your home and taken up a new residence, you will need to update your voter 
registration (by October 14, 2008) and vote in the election district and precinct for your new residence.
Supporting Documentation:
• Letter from the Attorney General to Linda Lamone regarding reports of voter challenges of persons whose homes 
have been foreclosed 9-24-2008. 
Campaign Merchandise
Rumor: If I wear a campaign button or t-shirt into the polling place, will I be allowed to vote? 
FACT: A voter may wear campaign paraphernalia (buttons, t-shirts, or stickers) into the polling place while he or she 
is there to vote (the voter may not linger in the polling place after voting). However, an election judge, challenger and 
watcher, or other person stationed inside the polling place or within 100 feet of the polling place may not wear or 
display campaign materials.
Voter Registration Card
Rumor: If the name that appears on the voters registration card does not match exactly as it appears on your driver’s 
license you will not be allowed to vote on November 4th.  The authorities at the polls will turn you away, fl at out.
FACT: This is not correct for several reasons:
• For voter registration purposes, the voter must use his or her legal name. However, there is no requirement that 
it be the full legal name. For example, you are not required to use your middle name on your voter registration 
application. 
• Most voters in Maryland are not required to show any identifi cation such as their voter registration card or 
their driver’s license. (Some fi rst time voters and voters who did not provide certain information on the voter 
registration application are are required to show identifi cation). 
• Voters are only required to provide their name when they check in to vote. A pollworker will confi rm the voter’s 
identity by having the voter provide his or her month and day of birth. 
• No voter in Maryland is simply turned away. Instead, all voters are given the opportunity to vote a provisional 
ballot. 
Rumor: I need my voter registration card to vote.
FACT: You do not need your voter notifi cation card to vote. When you check in to vote, you’ll be asked to provide your 
name, month and date of birth, and address. 
College Students
Rumor: If a college student registers to vote at the student’s college address the student’s parents will not be able to 
claim the student as a dependent for tax purposes.
FACT: Registering to vote in Maryland alone will not jeopardize a parent’s ability to claim a student as a dependent for 
tax purposes. 
Absentee Ballots
Rumor: Election offi cials automatically send out absentee ballot applications to voters who previously voted by 
absentee ballot.
FACT: Election offi cials do not automatically send out absentee ballot applications to voters who have previously voted 
by absentee ballot. Voters can obtain an absentee ballot application on this website or by calling the voter’s local 
election offi ce. 
Rumor: Election offi cials automatically send out absentee ballots to voters who previously voted by absentee ballot. 
FACT: A voter has the option on the absentee ballot application to request an absentee ballot for a primary election, 
a general election, or both. A voter who indicated that he or she wanted an absentee ballot for both the 2008 Primary 
and General Elections will automatically receive an absentee ballot for the upcoming general election. A voter who 
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only requested an absentee ballot for the 2008 Primary Election will not automatically receive an absentee ballot. 
He or she will have to submit an absentee ballot application to his or her local election offi ce to receive an absentee 
ballot for the 2008 General Election.
Registering before each Election
Rumor: Even though you are registered to vote, you still need to register again before the election.
FACT: If you have already registered to vote, you do not need to register again in order to vote in the upcoming General 
Election. You can check here to make sure you are registered to vote and that your information is up-to-date.
Provisional Voting
Rumor: I can go to any polling place in the State, vote a provisional ballot, and have my vote for President counted.
FACT: If you do not vote at the polling place where you reside, in most cases you will not be voting in your election 
district or ward and therefore your provisional ballot will not be counted. According to advice from the Offi ce of the 
Attorney General, a voter must cast his ballot in the election district or ward in which the voter resides.
All chief elections offi cers should use their websites in this helpful fashion.
In addition to using the website, the Obama campaign utilized the viral nature of the web by encouraging supporters 
to send emails to their friends debunking the lies and rumors surrounding his candidacy so that the truth may become 
what is common knowledge. The campaign provided an email address to which anyone who came across an email 
with phony information could forward it to the campaign so that it could be addressed quickly and correctly. 
Common Cause and Election Protection are undertaking a similar project, requesting that anyone who receives an 
email with false information or sees a spoofed website with misinformation forward that information on to by going to 
www.commoncause.org/DeceptivePractices or forwarding suspect email messages to DeceptivePractices2008@gmail.
com. 
There are also several existing websites dedicated to the debunking of misleading statements and rumors on and 
offl ine. Such sites include FactCheck.org, PolitiFact.com, and Snopes.com. Snopes has a section specifi cally dedicated 
to political myths http://www.snopes.com/politics/politics.asp. BreaktheChain.org is especially dedicated to setting 
straight email chain rumors spread through forwarded messages. A similar type site could be constructed regarding 
misleading information about the voting process.
Elections offi cers too, through whatever other online or offl ine megaphones they have at their disposal, provide 
detailed accurate information. They can use the media access available to them to inform people, ahead of time, of 
their rights and to advise them not to be taken in by any emails they may receive about the process. 
They must also be in a position to quickly and loudly debunk false online rumors through the web and the mainstream 
media, as well as through the networks of voting rights and community organizations, and make sure that accurate 
information is disseminated through those same mechanisms. Moreover, bloggers and other online journalists can 
play a role by quickly spotting malicious campaigns and exposing them. 
There may be some technology tools that we can use in the future to combat these challenges to our voting system. 
But for now, it is as it has always been: the best way to fi ght bad information will be by drowning it out with good 
information. 
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